Totally convex preferences for gambles by Nakamura Yutaka & 中村 豊
Totally convex preferences for gambles
著者 Nakamura Yutaka
発行年 2000
著作の一部 Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences
discussion paper series ~ no. 879
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/669
Totally Convex Preferences for Gambles
Yutaka Nakamura ∗
August, 2000
Abstract
Numerical representations that adimit total convexity of prefer-
ences include Chew’s weighted linear utility, Dekel’s implicit represen-
tation, and Fishburn’s SSB utility. This paper shows that existence
of a universally indifferent gamble and acyclicity of strict preferences
have significant implications for general axiomatizations of those rep-
resentations.
1 Introduction
Last two decades observed that numerous numerical representations and
their axiomatic developments have appeared to generalize the traditional
expected utility theories by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947,
1953), Savage (1954), and others. Many survey papers and books have
already been published to consult those research activities (for example, see
Fishburn (1988), Karni and Schmeidler (1991), Quiggin (1993), and Schmidt
(1998)).
One of the pioneering work for those generalizations is due to Chew’s
(1983) weighted linear utility, Dekel’s (1986) implicit representation, and
Fishburn’s (1982) SSB utility. Those representations have a common pref-
erence structure, to which we refer hereafter as a totally convex structure. A
typical characteristic of the structure is that every indifference surface in the
barycentric coordinate of the probability simplex (or Machina-Degroot tri-
angle), whose elements are indifferent to a gamble, consists of a hyperplane,
as opposed to curved surfaces supported by other generalizations such as
Quiggin’s (1982) anticipated utility, Machina’s (1982) generalized expected
utility, and other refined and generalized models.
Fishburn (1992, 1983, 1988) provided general representational implica-
tions of the totally convex structure. He elaborated on effects of transitivity
of the indifference relation on the structure, and showed that transitive in-
difference forces strict preference to be transitive, so that preferences must
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be weakly ordered. This finding has two representational implications. The
first is that a nontransitive convex representation, defined in the next sec-
tion, is reduced to a transitive convex representation, which is an alternative
to Dekel’s implicit representation. The second is that SSB utility is reduced
to Chew’s weighted linear utility.
It has been argued, however, that transitivity of the indifference relation
fails to hold due to imperfect powers of discrimination of the human judg-
ments (see for early discussions in economics Armstrong (1939), Georgescu-
Roegen (1936), Luce (1956), and many others). Therefore, it may be desir-
able to investigate axiomatic relationships among numerical representations
for the totally convex preferences without assuming transitivity of indiffer-
ences.
The aim of the paper is to explore such relationships. It is shown that ex-
istence of a universally indifferent gamble and acyclicity of strict preferences
have significant implications for general axiomatizations of those numerical
representaitons, where a gamble is univerally indifferent if it is indifferent
to every gamble. When there is no universally indifferent gamble, acyclicity
of strict preferences suffices to discriminate between nontransitive and tran-
sitive convex representations, and between SSB utility and weighted linear
utility. In this case, acyclicity forces indifference to be transitive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the totally convex
structure and describes two numerical representations, which accommodate
preference cycles and intransitive idifference. Section 3 elaborate acyclicity
on the nontransitive convex representation. Section 4 presents necessary
and sufficient axiom for the separable SSB representation, and then shows
that acyclicity reduces SSB utility to weighted linear utility.
2 Totally Convex Preferences
A gamble on a set X of decision outcomes is a nonnegative function p on
X for which {x ∈ X : p(x) 6= 0} is finite and ∑x∈X p(x) = 1. Every
gamble p on X is interpreted as giving an outcome x with probability p(x).
Let G denote the set of all gambles. A probability mixture of two gambles
p, q ∈ G with respect to a probability number 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, denoted p©λ q,
is a nonnegative function on X that takes value λp(x) + (1 − λ)q(x) at
x ∈ X. Since p and q are gambles, p©λ q is also a gamble, so by definition,
p©λ q ∈ G .
By , we denote a binary strict preference relation on G , read as “is
preferred to.” Let the indifference relation ∼ and the weak preference re-
lation  be defined in the usual way: for all p, q ∈ G , p ∼ q if ¬(p  q)
and ¬(q  p), and p  q if ¬(q  p). Let G ∗ denote the preference interior
of G , and Gmax and Gmin respectively denote the preference-maximal and
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preference-minimal subsets of G , which are defined by
G ∗ = {p ∈ G : q  p and p  r for some q, r ∈ G },
Gmax = {p ∈ G : p  q for all q ∈ G },
Gmin = {p ∈ G : q  p for all q ∈ G }.
We say that (G ,) is closed if Gmax and Gmin are nonempty, open if Gmax =
Gmin = ∅, and half-open otherwise.
A totally convex structure of preferences is stated as follows.
Definition 2.1 (G ,) is said to be a totally convex structure if the fol-
lowing two axioms hold: for all p, q, r ∈ G and all 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
Axiom C (continuity) If p  q and q  r, then there is an 0 < α < 1
such that q ∼ p©α r.
Axiom TC (total convexity) If p  q and p  r, then p  q©λ r; if
p ∼ q and p ∼ r, then p ∼ q©λ r; q  p and r  p, then q©λ r  p.
Axioms C and TC were first introduced by Fishburn (1982). Axiom TC
implies that a probability number α in a probability mixture p ©α r in
axiom C is “uniquely” determined.
It is shown in Fishburn (1988, Theorem 4.2) that if (G ,) is a open
and totally convex structure, then (G ,) has the following numerical rep-
resentation, referred to as a nontransitive convex representation: there is a
functional φ on G × G such that, for all p, q, r ∈ G and all 0 < λ < 1,
p  q ⇔ φ(p, q) > 0,
φ(p, q) > 0 ⇔ φ(q, p) < 0,
φ(p©λ q, r) = λφ(p, r) + (1− λ)φ(q, r).
The second property of φ indicates asymmetry of , and the third requires
linearity in the first argument. The functional φ on G × G is said to be
skew-symmeric if, for all p, q ∈ G ,
φ(p, q) = −φ(q, p).
Then φ in the nontransitive convex representation is called an SSB functional
if it is skew-symmetric and bilinear, i.e., linear separately in each argument
of φ. Note that skew-symmetry and linearity in the first argument implies
linearity in the second argument.
Fishburn (1982) showed that (G ,) has an SSB representation, i.e., there
is an SSB functional φ on G × G such that, for all p, q ∈ G ,
p  q ⇔ φ(p, q) > 0,
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if and only if (G ,) is a totally convex structure and the following symmetry
axiom holds: for all p, q, r ∈ G and all 0 < λ < 1,
Axiom S (symmetry) If p  q, q  r, p  r, and q ∼ p© 1
2
r, then
p©λ r ∼ p© 1
2
q ⇐⇒ r©λ p ∼ r© 1
2
q.
3 Transitive Convex Representations
We say that (G ,) has a transitive convex representation if there is a func-
tional u on G such that, for all p, q ∈ G ,
p  q ⇔ u(p) > u(q),
p  q ⇒ u(p©λ q) is continuous and increasing in λ.
It is shown by Fishburn (1983, Theorem 1) that (G ,) has a transitive
convex representation if and only if (G ,) is a countably bounded, totally
convex structure with transitive indifference ∼, where we say that (G ,) is
countablly bounded if there is a countable subset Q of G such that for every
p ∈ G , there are q, r ∈ Q for which q  p and p  r. If (G ,) is closed, it
is clearly countably bounded; otherwise, it need not be. Fishburn (1983b)
demonstrated that the countable boundedness cannot be dropped to ensure
the existence of the transitive convex representation.
In place of transitivity of the indifference relation, we shall consider
acyclic strict preferences for the totally convex structure. For a given pos-
itive integer n > 2,  is said to be n-acyclic if, for all p1, . . . , pn ∈ G ,
¬(pn  p1) whenever pi  pi+1 for i = 1, . . . , n−1. We say that  is acyclic
if it is n-acyclic for all integers n > 0.
Lemma 3.1 If (G ,) is a totally convex structure, then 3-acyclicity im-
plies acyclicity.
Proof. Suppose that (G ,) is a totally convex structure, and that  is
3-acyclic. We show acyclicity of  by induction. Assume that  is k-acyclic
for k = 3, . . . , n− 1. We are to show that it is n-acyclic. Let p1  · · ·  pn
and pn  p1. By the induction hypothesis, p1  p3 and p2  p4. Thus
by axiom TC, p1  p2 ©λ p3 and p2 ©λ p3  p4 for all 0 < λ < 1. Since
p1  p2©λ p3  p4  · · ·  pn  p1, (n− 1)-acyclicity is violated. 2
For a subset Q of G and p ∈ G , we shall write p ∼ (respectively,)Q
when p ∼ (respectively,)q for all q ∈ Q, and Q  p when q  p for all
q ∈ Q. Let G 0 = {p ∈ G : p ∼ G }. A gamble in G 0 is said to be universally
indifferent. Given a finite subset {p1, . . . , pn+1} of G , let the convex hull be
defined by
H({p1, . . . , pn+1})
= {(· · · (p1©λ1 p2)©λ2 p3) · · ·)©λn pn : 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n}.
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We say that a convex hull H({p1, . . . , pn}) contains a cyclic preference (or
simply a cycle) if there are p, q, r in the hull such that p  q, q  r, and
r  p.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that (G ,) is a 3-acyclic, totally convex structure.
For all p, q, r ∈ G , if p ∼ {q, r} and q  r, then p ∈ G 0.
Proof. Suppose that the hypotheses of the lemma hold. Assume that p is
not a universally indifferent gamble. Then there is an s ∈ G such that either
p  s or s  p. We are to show that H(p, q, r, s) has a cycle, contradicting
3-acyclicity.
We have the following five cases to examine:
Case 1. either s  {p, q, r} or {p, q, r}  s;
Case 2. either q  s  p or p  s  r;
Case 3. either {q, r} ∼ s  p or p  s ∼ {q, r};
Case 4. either q ∼ s  {p, r} or {p, q}  s ∼ r;
Case 5. either r  s  p and s ∼ q, or p  s  q and s ∼ r.
Case 1. Assume s  {p, q, r}. The other case can be similarly proved. By
C and TC, q ∼ s©α r for a unique 0 < α < 1. Take any 0 < β < α, so that
q  s©β r. Since s  s©β r  p, axioms C and TC give s©β r  s©γ p
for small γ > 0. By TC, s©γ p  q. Hence H({p, q, r, s}) contains a cycle.
Case 2. Assume q  s  p. A similar proof applies to the other possibility.
By C and TC, s  q©α p and r©α q  s for small α > 0. Since, by TC,
q ∼ q©α p  r, axiom TC gives q©α p  q©λ r for all 0 < λ < 1. Hence
H({p, q, r, s}) contains a cycle.
Case 3. Assume that {q, r} ∼ s  p. The other case is similar. By TC,
s©α q  r for any 0 < α < 1, so s©α q  q©β r for any 0 < β < 1. It
follows from Case 1 that H({p, r, s©α q, q©β r}) has a cycle.
Case 4. Assume that q ∼ s  {p, r}. The other case is similar. By TC,
s  q©α r for any 0 < α < 1. Thus by Case 1, H({p, r, s, q©α r}) has a
cycle.
Case 5. Assume that r  s  p and s ∼ q. The other case is similar. By
TC, q©α r  s for any 0 < α < 1. By Case 2, H({p, r, s, q©α r}) has a
cycle. 2
The main result of this section is given by the following theorem, which
says that if there is no universally indifferent gamble, then the transitive
indifference can be replaced by 3-acyclicity in Fishburn’s transitive convex
representation theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (G ,) is a 3-acyclic, countably bounded, totally convex
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structure, and G 0 = ∅ if and only if (G ,) has a transitive convex rep-
resentation.
Proof. Suppose that G 0 = ∅. Then by Lemma 3.2, 3-acyclicity implies
that ∼ is transitive. Therefore the conclusion of the theorem follows from
Theorem 1 in Fishburn (1983). A transitive convex representation requires
that  is a weak order. Since G 0 = Gmax ∩Gmin, G 0 = ∅ is necessary for the
representation. 2
4 Separable SSB Representations
A linear functional on G is a real valued function u for which, for all p, q ∈ G
and all 0 < λ < 1,
u(p©λ q) = λu(p) + (1− λ)u(q).
We say that (G ,) has a separable SSB representation (u,w) if u and w are
are linear functionals on G such that, for all p, q ∈ G ,
p  q ⇐⇒ u(p)w(q) > u(q)w(p).
If we let φ(p, q) = u(p)w(q) − u(q)w(p) for all p, q ∈ G , then φ is an SSB
functional on G×G . Therefore, if (G ,) has a separable SSB representation,
then it is a symmetric totally convex structure.
Given a separable SSB representation (u,w), let Gw = {p ∈ G : w(p) >
0}. An interesting feature of the representation (u,w) is that, for all p, q ∈
Gw and all 0 < λ < 1,
p  q ⇔ v(p) > v(q),
v(p©λ q) = λw(p)v(p) + (1− λ)w(q)v(q)
λw(p) + (1− λ)w(q) ,
where v(p) = u(p)/w(p) for all p ∈ Gw.
A separable SSB representation (u,w) is said to be a weighted linear
representation if w ≥ 0, and w(p) > 0 whenever (P,) is open or closed. If
(G ,) is half-open, the representation requires w(p) > 0 for every p ∈ G ∗.
However, some half-open situations force w to vanish on the one of Gmax
and Gmin that is not empty. In all cases, w must be positive throughout G ∗.
Fishburn (1983) showed that (G ,) is an indifference-transitive, symmetric,
and totally convex structure if and only if (G ,) has a weighted linear
representation (u,w).
The aim of this section is to show a necessary and sufficient axiom for
the separable SSB representation and to explore the effects of acyclicity on
the representation. The following axiom, which applies to all p, q, r ∈ G , is
necessary and sufficient for separable SSB representability of the symmetric,
totally convex preferences.
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Axiom UI (universal indifference) If p ∼ q, q ∼ r, and p  r, then
q ∼ G .
The axiom idnetifies a condition that the set of universal indifferent gambles
satisfies. It says that if a gamble q is indifferent to both of gambles p and r,
and p and r are not indifferent, then q must be universally indifferent.
A characterization of the separable SSB representation is given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that (G ,) is a nonempty, symmetric totally con-
vex structure. Then the universal indifference axiom UI holds if and only if
(G ,) has a separable SSB representation.
Proof. Let (u,w) be a separable SSB representation for  on P. The
necessities of the axioms C, TC, and S easily obtain. To see necessity of
axiom UI, assume that p ∼ q, q ∼ r, and p  r. Then we have
u(p)w(q) = u(q)w(p),
u(q)w(r) = u(r)w(q),
u(p)w(r) > u(r)w(p).
If w(r) = 0 or w(p) = 0, then w(q) = u(q) = 0, so that q ∼ G . Thus we
sssume that w(r) 6= 0 and w(p) 6= 0. If w(q) 6= 0, then the above three
equations give
u(q)
w(q)
=
u(p)
w(p)
>
u(r)
w(r)
=
u(q)
w(q)
,
a contradiction. Therefore, w(q) = 0. The second equation gives u(q) = 0,
so that q ∼ G .
Next we show sufficiencies of axioms C, TC, S, and UI. Suppose that
axioms C, TC, S, and UI hold. Then there is an SSB functional φ on G ×G
such that, for all p, q ∈ G ,
p  q ⇐⇒ φ(p, q) > 0.
For all p, q, r, s ∈ G , let
Φ(p, q, r, s) = φ(p, q)φ(r, s) + φ(p, r)φ(s, q) + φ(p, s)φ(q, r).
It suffices to show that Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0 for all p, q, r, s ∈ G .
Noting that, for every permutation σ on {1, 2, 3, 4},
Φ(p1, p2, p3, p4) = (−1)δ(σ)Φ(pσ(1), pσ(2), pσ(3), pσ(4)),
where δ(σ) = 1 if σ is an odd permutation, and 0 otherwise, we have four
cases to examine:
7
Case 1. p ∼ q and q ∼ r.
Case 2. p ∼ q, p  r, and r  q.
Case 3. p ∼ q and either r  {p, q} or {p, q}  r.
Case 4. neither two of p, q, r, and s are indifferent.
Case 1. Assume that p ∼ q and q ∼ r. Then φ(p, q) = φ(q, r) = 0. If
p ∼ r, then φ(p, r) = 0, so that Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0. If ¬(p ∼ r), then, by UI,
s ∼ q, so φ(s, q) = 0. Thus Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0.
Case 2. Assume that p ∼ q, p  r, and r  q. By C and TC, r ∼ p©α q
for a unique 0 < α < 1. Since, by TC, p ∼ p©α q, it follows from UI that
p©α q ∼ s.
Since p©α q ∼ {r, s}, we have
αφ(p, r) + (1− α)φ(q, r) = 0,
αφ(p, s) + (1− α)φ(q, s) = 0,
which give φ(p, r)φ(q, s) = φ(p, s)φ(q, r). Hence Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0, since
φ(p, q) = 0.
Case 3. Assume that p ∼ q and r  {p, q}. The proof for the other case
is similar. We have two subcases to examine: {p, q}  s; s  {p, q}.
Assume first that {p, q}  s. Then by C, TC, and UI, {p, q} ∼ r©α s
for a unique 0 < α < 1. A similar analysis to Case 2 gives Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0.
Assume next that s  {p, q}. Suppose that s  r. When r  s, the proof
is similar. Then by C and TC, r ∼ {s©α p, s©β q} for unique α, β ∈ (0, 1).
Thus we have
αφ(r, s) + (1− α)φ(r, p) = 0,
βφ(r, s) + (1− β)φ(r, q) = 0,
which give
α∗φ(r, p) = β∗φ(r, q),
where λ∗ = (1− λ)/λ for any 0 < λ < 1.
By UI, s©α p ∼ s©β q. Thus we have
β∗φ(s, q) = α∗φ(s, p),
which together with the last equation of the preceding paragraph gives
φ(r, p)φ(s, q) = φ(r, q)φ(s, p).
Hence Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0.
Suppose next that s ∼ r. By TC, s  r©λ q  {p, q} for all 0 < λ < 1.
Therefore, it follows from the preceding two paragraphs that Φ(p, q, r ©λ
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q, s) = 0, so that
Φ(p, q, r©λ q, s)
= φ(p, r©λ q)φ(s, q) + φ(p, s)φ(q, r©λ q)
= λΦ(p, q, r, s).
Hence Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0.
Case 4. Assume that neither two of p, q, r, and s are indifferent. Let
p  q  r and p  r with no loss of generality. By C and TC, q ∼ p©α r
for a unique 0 < α < 1. Then αφ(p, q) = (1 − α)φ(q, r). By Case 3,
Φ(q, p©α r, p, s) = Φ(q, p©α r, p, r) = 0, each of which gives
φ(q, p)φ(s, p©α r) = φ(q, s)φ(p, p©α r),
φ(q, p)φ(r, p©α r) = φ(q, r)φ(p, p©α r).
Since the both sides of the second equality are not zero, we divide the first
by the second, and use bilinearity of φ to get
[αφ(s, p) + (1− α)φ(s, r)]φ(q, r) = αφ(q, s)φ(r, p).
Substituting (1 − α)φ(q, r) = αφ(p, q) for the above, skew-symmetry of φ
yields Φ(p, q, r, s) = 0. 2
We note that a separable SSB representation may allow for a preference
cycle as shown by the following example.
Example 4.1. Let (u,w) be a separable SSB representation for (G ,).
For a positive number , let (u(p), w(p)) = (−2,−), (u(q), w(q)) = (,−),
and (u(r), w(r)) = (, ). Then
u(p)w(q)− u(q)w(p) = 32,
u(q)w(r)− u(r)w(q) = 22,
u(r)w(p)− u(p)w(r) = 2,
so that p  q, q  r, and r  p.
The following theorem that acyclicity of strict preference forcesw in a
separable SSB representation (u,w) to be nonnegative. Note by Lemma 3.1
that 3-acyclicity implies acyclicity.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that (G ,) is a nonempty, symmetric, totally con-
vex structure. Then  is 3-acyclic on G if and only if (G ,) has a separable
SSB representation (u,w) with w ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose first that (G ,) has a separable SSB represenation (u,w)
with w ≥ 0. Necessity of C, TC, and S easily follows. To show necessity of
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3-acyclicity of , assume that p  q, q  r, and r  p. Then we derive a
contradiction. By the representation, we have
u(p)w(q) > u(q)w(p),
u(q)w(r) > u(r)w(q),
u(r)w(p) > u(p)w(r).
If w(q) = 0, then the first inequality gives w(p) > 0 and u(q) < 0, and
the second inequality gives w(r) > 0 and u(q) > 0, a contradiction. When
w(r) = 0 or w(p) = 0, we obtain similar contradictions. Therefore, we must
have w(p) > 0, w(q) > 0, and w(r) > 0. Hence the above three inequalities
respectively give
u(p)
w(p)
>
u(q)
w(q)
,
u(q)
w(q)
>
u(r)
w(r)
,
u(r)
w(r)
>
u(p)
w(p)
,
a contradiction. Hence 3-acyclicity of  must hold.
Suppose next that axioms C, TC, and S hold, and that  is 3-acyclic.
By Lemma 2.2, C, TC, and 3-acyclicity of  imply UI. Thus it follows from
Theorem 3.1 that (G ,) has a separable SSB representaion (u,w). We are
to show that w can be transformed to a linear functional σ ≥ 0 on G so that
(u, σ) is also a separable SSB representation for (G ,).
Let R2 be two-dimensional Euclidean space. The range of the separable
SSB representation (u,w) is defined by
R(u,w) = {(u(p), w(p)) ∈ R2 : p ∈P}.
Let R0(u,w) be the set of all interior points of R(u,w). We show that
(0, 0) 6∈ R0(u,w). Suppose on the contrary that (0, 0) ∈ R0(u,w). Then
there exists an open disk D centered at the origin (0, 0) such that D ⊂
R0(u,w). As in Example 4.1, we take  > 0 so small that (−2,−), (,−)
and (, ) are contained in the disk D. Since there are gambles p, q, r such
that (u(p), w(p)) = (−2,−), (u(q), w(q)) = (,−) and (u(r), w(r)) =
(, ), those gambels form a preference cycle, p  q  r  p, contradicting
3-acyclicity of .
Since (0, 0) 6∈ R0(u,w), it is easy to see that there is a straight line L
through the origin that divides R2 into two regions, one of which includes
R0(u,w). Suppose that L is the y-axis. If u ≥ 0, then (−u − w, u) is a
separable SSB representation. To see this, we note
p  q ⇐⇒ u(p)w(q) > u(q)w(p)
⇐⇒ −u(q)w(p) > −u(p)w(q)
⇐⇒ (−u(p)− w(p))u(q) > (−u(q)− w(q))u(p).
If u ≤ 0, then so is similarly (−u− w,−u).
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Suppose next that the y-axis cannot be L. Then there is a real number
a such that either w(p) ≥ au(p) for all p ∈ G or w(p) ≤ au(p) for all p ∈ G .
If w(p) ≥ au(p) for all p ∈ G , then let ω(p) = w(p)− au(p), so that, for all
p, q ∈ G ,
p  q ⇐⇒ u(p)w(q) > u(q)w(p)
⇐⇒ u(p)(ω(q) + au(q)) > u(q)(ω(p) + au(p))
⇐⇒ u(p)ω(q) > u(q)ω(p).
Hence (u, ω) with ω ≥ 0 is a separable SSB repesentation for (G ,).
If w(p) ≤ au(p) for all p ∈ G , then let u′ = −u and w′ = −w, so that
(u′, w′) is also a separable SSB representation for (G ,) and w′ ≥ au′. Hence
it follows from the preceding paragraph that (u′, w′−au′) with w′−au′ ≥ 0
is a separable SSB representation for (G ,). 2
Noting that if (u,w) is a separabble SSB representation for (G ,), and
G 0 6= ∅, then (u(p), w(p)) = (0, 0) for no p ∈ G , an immdediate corollary of
Theorem 4.2 is given by
Corollary 4.1 (G ,) is a nonempty, symmetric, 3-acyclic, totally convex
structure, and G 0 = ∅ if and only if (G ,) has a weighted linear represen-
tation.
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